Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Joanna N. Erdman

2007

Achieving Transparency in Implementing
Abortion Laws
Rebecca J. Cook
Joanna N. Erdman, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
Bernard Dickens, University of Toronto

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/joanna-erdman/11/

International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics (2007) 99, 157–161

a v a i l a b l e a t w w w. s c i e n c e d i r e c t . c o m

w w w. e l s e v i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / i j g o

ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

Achieving transparency in implementing
abortion laws
R.J. Cook a , J.N. Erdman b , B.M. Dickens a,⁎
a

Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medicine and Joint Centre for Bioethics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Health Equity and Law Clinic, International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
b

KEYWORDS
Abortion;
Duties to clarify law;
Implementing abortion
law;
Judicial clarification of
law;
Lawful abortion;
Legal transparency;
States’ clarification of law

Abstract
National and international courts and tribunals are increasingly ruling that although states may
aim to deter unlawful abortion by criminal penalties, they bear a parallel duty to inform
physicians and patients of when abortion is lawful. The fear is that women are unjustly denied
safe medical procedures to which they are legally entitled, because without such information
physicians are deterred from involvement. With particular attention to the European Court of
Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, and the US Supreme Court, decisions are explained that show
the responsibility of states to make rights to legal abortion transparent. Litigants are persuading
judges to apply rights to reproductive health and human rights to require states’ explanations of
when abortion is lawful, and governments are increasingly inspired to publicize regulations or
guidelines on when abortion will attract neither police nor prosecutors’ scrutiny.
© 2007 International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.
All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Initiatives in several countries address and remedy uncertainties in how abortion laws are to be implemented.
Legislation usually sets penalties for unlawful abortion, but
fails to distinguish how increasingly liberalized grounds for
lawful abortion are established, so deterring medical practitioners from promptly delivering the care to which women
are legally entitled. Some government agencies are respond-
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ing to this concern by specifying tests physicians may apply to
ensure that they act within the law and will not be subject to
judicial proceedings.
For instance, Article 86 of the Criminal Code of Argentina
renders abortion lawful when the health of the pregnant
woman is at stake, or pregnancy is due to rape. In February
2007, a case of a 14-year-old girl raped by her stepfather
had to reach the Court of Appeal of the City of Mar del Plata
before her therapeutic abortion could be undertaken [1].
Consequently, in March 2007, the Minister of Health of the
Province of Buenos Aires created a program to end uncertainties physicians face when considering abortions lawful
under Article 86, and to prevent their decisions being
subject to judicial challenge [2]. The program followed the
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Court of Appeal’s decision on criteria of danger to physical
or mental health, and of sexual assault, that protect
physicians who reach abortion decisions with patients. The
Social Action and Health Committee of the National House of
Representatives in Argentina had filed a report favoring this
development in June 2005 [3].
These initiatives reflect and anticipate requirements of
leading courts that laws or governments authoritatively
specify the circumstances in which physicians will be secure
from police action and prosecutors’ opposition in acceding to
their patients’ requests for legal abortions. Several recent
decisions of international human rights courts and commissions, constitutional and national supreme and comparable
courts address governmental duties regarding implementation of abortion laws.

2. European Court of Human Rights
The case of Tysiac against Poland [4] involved a woman
suffering from severe myopia who was bringing up two small
children alone, and feared on diagnosis of her third
pregnancy that the stress would further harm her sight and
render her almost blind. Three ophthalmologists agreed that
pathological changes in her retina were such that pregnancy
and delivery constituted a risk to her eyesight, but refused
the request to certify that abortion was indicated, and
recommended only avoidance of exertion and postnatal
sterilization. The Criminal Code of Poland renders termination of pregnancy imprisonable, but the Family Planning
(Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting
Pregnancy Termination) Act of 1993, as amended, provides in
Section 4(a) (1) (1) that a physician may undertake abortion
where “pregnancy endangers the mother’s life or health.”
However, the specialists refused to issue certificates on the
ground that, although the retina might detach itself as a
result of pregnancy, it was not certain that it would.
Subsequently, a general practitioner certified that the
third pregnancy presented the risk of rupture of the uterus,
since the two previous deliveries were cesarean, and that
the physical strain of pregnancy and raising two small
children alone would seriously aggravate her visual disability.
A 1997 ordinance of the Ministry of Health required that
certification of abortion based on danger to life or health be
attested by a consultant specialist in the medical field relevant to the woman’s condition. However, the head of the
Clinic of Gynaecology and Obstetrics in Warsaw, to which the
woman was assigned, declined on a superficial examination
to attest the general practitioner’s certification. After the
woman’s cesarean delivery, her eyesight deteriorated badly,
and she faced the risk of blindness with no prospects of
surgical correction.
Failing to obtain any redress in Polish judicial or administrative tribunals, she applied to the European Court of
Human Rights, which found the claim admissible. The key
issue concerned violation of Article 8(1) of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that “Everyone has the
right to respect for his private… life.” The Court noted that
“private life” is a broad term, encompassing physical and
psychological integrity, that a woman’s decision to resort to
lawful abortion is private, and that Poland had violated
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Article 8(1). Drawing on its own earlier judgments, the Court
observed in para. 110 of its judgment that it had previously
ruled that:
there may… be positive obligations [on a state] inherent in an
effective “respect” for private life. These obligations may
involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect
for private life even in the sphere of relations between
individuals, including both the provision of a regulatory
framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery
protecting individuals’ rights and implementation, where
appropriate, of specific measures [5].
Poland was found in violation of women’s rights to abortion that was lawful under its legislation, because it had
failed to create a regulatory framework under which women
would know how to access procedures to which they are
entitled, to be involved in the decision-making processes
affecting them, and to obtain independent review of unfavorable decisions.
The Court reiterated in para. 113 that:
The Convention [on Human Rights] is intended to guarantee
not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are
practical and effective…
That is, Poland is obligated to create means to ensure that
women’s interests in lawful abortion procedures are served
by regulations that achieve their timely, safe, and voluntary
access in conditions of privacy and respect.
The Court further noted, in para. 116 of its judgment that:
the legal prohibition on abortion, taken together with the
risk of their incurring criminal responsibility under… the
Criminal Code, can well have a chilling effect on doctors
when deciding whether the requirements of legal abortion
are met in an individual case. The provisions regulating the
availability of lawful abortion should be formulated in such a
way as to alleviate this effect. Once the legislature decides
to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in
a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it.
This observation addresses the long history of abortion
legislation that includes conditions that deliberately or
incidentally obstruct or deny practical access [6]. In para.
124, the Court based its condemnation on the ground that:
it has not been demonstrated that Polish law… contained any
effective mechanisms capable of determining whether the
conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met… As
a result, the applicant suffered severe distress and anguish
when contemplating the possible negative consequences of
her pregnancy and upcoming delivery for her health.

3. UN Human Rights Committee
The case known as KL against Peru [7] arose under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Peru had ratified the protocol, allowing its
citizens to proceed against it before the Committee, but
failed to cooperate in these proceedings, to contest
evidence submitted by KL, and to defend actions for which
the State was responsible.
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KL became pregnant when aged 17, and her fetus was
found anencephalic. A gynecologist/obstetrician at the Archbishop Loayza National Hospital in Lima wrote that continuation of pregnancy posed a risk to her life. He
recommended abortion, which Peruvian law allows on this
indication, and KL and her mother approved. However, the
abortion required authorization from the hospital’s director,
which he refused on the claim, unsupported by a legal
opinion, that the procedure was unlawful unless it was the
only way to save KL’s life or avoid serious permanent damage
to her health. KL delivered a baby that survived for four days,
and was required to undertake breast-feeding. KL suffered
consequent deep depression, which was psychiatrically
found to have a severe impact on her development and
future mental health.
The Committee considered the State’s conduct according
to provisions of the Covenant, and found Peru in violation of
Article 7, which forbids cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. Such treatment consisted in the director of the
State’s hospital ignoring the risk expressed in the letter of his
hospital’s gynecologist/obstetrician, and compelling KL to
endure the distress of seeing her baby’s gross deformities
and to breastfeed knowing that the baby was soon to die.
Further, a violation was found of Article 17, which prohibits
arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy. Interference
consisted in the director of the State hospital denying KL a
procedure to which she was legally entitled, and her
compliance with her gynecologist’s recommendation.
Reinforcing these violations, the Committee found a
violation of Covenant Article 24, in that the State did not
afford KL the special care due to her as a minor, particularly
the medical and psychological support necessary in her
pregnancy and its compelled continuation. In conjunction
with other violations, the Committee also found a transcending violation of Article 2, which requires States “to take the
necessary steps… to adopt such legislative or other measures
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.” The Article also requires States to
ensure effective remedies for violations, including judicial
recourse. KL lacked an adequate legal remedy in Peru for the
State’s violations of her rights, and adequate preventative
measures, including adequate guidance to the hospital director and others of physical and mental health indications
for lawful abortion [8].

4. Constitutional Court of Colombia
The Penal Code of Colombia prohibits abortion in absolute
terms, although when the Code provisions were challenged
as a violation of the 1991 Constitution of Colombia, the
Attorney General defended the Code as allowing a woman
and physician to plead necessity to preserve the woman’s life
[9]. Beyond a traditionally narrow approach to the law,
however, the Attorney General took the enlightened view of
measuring the punitive Code against the more liberal values
of the Colombian Constitution, which includes the commitment to comply with the country’s international responsibilities under human rights treaties.
The proceedings by five citizens of Colombia for a
declaration of unconstitutionality were potentially adversarial, but for the government, the Attorney General agreed
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with the plaintiffs that voluntary termination of pregnancy
should not be a crime when conception was not consented to
by the pregnant woman, such as when imposed by rape, when
the pregnancy presented serious risk to her life or physical or
mental health, or when medical certification shows serious
illness or malformation that makes the fetus nonviable.
The Attorney General argued that analysis of the principle
of protection of human dignity contained in the Constitution,
and of the rights to life and liberty embodied in this principle,
renders criminalization of abortion in the above circumstances an irrational and disproportionate punishment for
women, which violates their rights, exceeds the legislature’s
discretion over criminal matters, and is unconstitutional. The
Court’s judgment of 2006 reflected this approach, referring
to the range of international human rights treaties Colombia
has ratified. It gave particular attention to women’s rights,
noting that:
The 1991 Constitution expressly sets out the goal of
recognizing and enhancing the rights of women, as well as
of reinforcing these rights by protecting them in an effective
and decisive manner. Thus, women are now entitled to
special constitutional protection and their rights must be
recognized and protected by government authorities,
including those within the legal system, without exception…. [10]
The Court addressed obligations under both the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, and the concept of reproductive health and associated rights developed through the Programme of Action
of the 1994 UN International (Cairo) Conference on Population and Development, and the Beijing Platform of the 1995
Fourth World Conference on Women. The Court went back to
the 1968 First World Conference on Human Rights, held in
Teheran where, for the first time, the basic human right of
parents “to determine freely and responsibly the number and
spacing of their children” was recognized [10]. Rights of
reproductive choice were further considered in the context
of the American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San
José, Costa Rica,” in force since 1978, and the evolving
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Expansive though the Court was on women’s rights, and
recognizing that “[t]he legislature must not impose the role
of procreator on a woman against her will,” [11] the declaration requested confined the Court to stating limits on
the role of criminal law in regulating abortion. The Court
could not direct the legislature on positive measures it
should enact to ensure women’s access to lawful procedures,
but could only review action after it occurs, since “[t]he
intervention of the constitutional judge comes… only in order
to examine whether the legislature has exercised its powers
within the limits of its discretion” [12].

5. Northern Ireland Court of Appeal
In 2004, the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, the highest
court in the province, decided a case in which the Family
Planning Association of Northern Ireland sued the provincial
health ministry for a declaration that the ministry’s failure
to clarify and publicize women’s rights to access abortion
services under prevailing law violated the ministry’s legal
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duties [13]. The declaration was sought since the liberalizing UK Abortion Act 1967 is inapplicable in Northern
Ireland, and each year an estimated 2000 women from the
province go to Britain for abortions that are lawful there,
each at a cost of between £500 and £1200. Women unable
to afford this cost, or to travel, must continue gestation, or
risk unskilled abortion, even when prevailing law in Northern Ireland allows physicians to act, if not deterred by the
fear of prosecution and up to life imprisonment.
The trial judge explained that, under prevailing law,
abortion is lawful in Northern Ireland when a physician, in
good faith, finds that continuation of pregnancy would
seriously endanger a woman’s life or her physical or mental
health, but refused the declaration on the ground that his
ruling provided all necessary clarification. The Court of
Appeal’s three judges granted the declaration, since the
ministry was under affirmative duties realistically to assess
the need for abortion services, including for women
returning from elsewhere following abortions, and publicize
how the ministry proposed to meet that need [14].
Physicians’ apprehension of a law expressed only prohibitively, with liability to a ferocious penalty, needed to be
redressed by assurances of what procedures would attract
neither police scrutiny nor penalty.
The Court of Appeal formally required the ministry only to
assess the evidence of women’s need for services, and propose means to assure appropriate medical care in Northern
Ireland with privacy and dignity. However, the judges offered
guidance on what types of regulations would be appropriate,
and observed that inadequate ministry proposals would be
open to further judicial review.

6. United States Supreme Court
The US Supreme Court decision of April 2007 in Gonzales vs
Carhart [15] may be more significant for what it foreshadows
than for its direct effect on abortion services. In 2000, a
differently composed US Supreme Court held legislation from
Nebraska on late-term abortions of pre-viable fetuses
unconstitutional, on grounds of vagueness or over-inclusiveness, and absence of an exception to preserve women’s
health [16]. The 2007 case concerned an almost identical
federal Act, named in non-medical language the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, of 2003. The Court’s five-to-four majority
found this Act more precise, however, and ruled it constitutional, although it again included no exception permitting
the otherwise prohibited procedure when physicians find it
indicated in their patients’ health interests.
Membership of the US Supreme Court results from overtly
political decisions. For the executive branch of government
Presidents offer nominees, and for the legislative branch the
Senate Judiciary Committee recommends approval or
rejection. When appointed, the judges (called “justices”)
do not apply the collegial approach of other Supreme
Courts, in which in subsequent cases minority judges defer
to the majority [17], but maintain individualistic approaches. For instance, the three justices dissenting from
the majority six in the landmark 1973 abortion decision in
Roe vs Wade [18] contributed to polarization on the issue, in
that those favoring their approach hoped that their numbers
could be raised to a majority by judicial replacements of the
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prevailing justices. The issue has so permeated US politics
and public life that potential judicial nominees’ perceived
position on abortion has become a litmus test of their
prospects.
Political dominance of this single issue has discredited the
international standing of US judgments. The 1973 decision
was widely respected in other countries, and influenced
decisions of other leading courts, such as in Canada [19].
However, more recently, courts outside the country, such as
the English High Court [20], have found US abortion decisions
irrelevant, due to their peculiar preoccupation with this
issue and its colonizing effect on other legal concerns, and
US non-membership of leading international human rights
treaty regimes.
It remains unclear how far the 2007 decision will reach.
The federal Act bans the procedure variously medically
described as “intact dilation and evacuation” (intact D&E),
“dilation and extraction” (D&X), and “intact D&X.” The
Court recognized that the Act does not cover a procedure
in which a fetus is intended to be removed in parts, so that
it affects not accidental intact D & E, nor the number of
abortions themselves, but only those by surgical techniques
designed to achieve abortion by partial delivery of a living
fetus. The Court found that the legislature could in
principle constitutionally ban such procedures.
The Court accepted its previous rulings that abortion
prohibitions are unconstitutional if they involve an “undue
burden” on women seeking abortions before fetal viability
[21]. The Court found that nothing in the language of the
2003 Act imposed such a burden. It discounted medical
evidence that intact D&E is safer for women’s health because
it decreases risks of cervical laceration and uterine perforation, of removing bony fetal fragments, and of leaving fetal
parts in the uterus. However, it recognized that actual
evidence could render application of the Act unconstitutional, since “the proper manner to protect the health of the
woman [is] if it can be shown that in discrete and welldefined instances a particular condition has [occurred] or is
likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act
must be used” [22]. That is, the Act remains open to constitutional challenge, but only after the facts of particular
instances have shown application of the Act to jeopardize
women’s health.

7. Conclusion
The US Supreme Court decision of April 2007, upholding
restrictive legislation, runs counter to the general thrust of
judicial decisions and governmental regulations, which have
opened lawful pathways for access to medically indicated
abortion. The concept of reproductive health and of associated reproductive rights, together with the need to protect
women’s health against the scourge of unskilled abortion, has
taken effect in some countries to inspire public and/or private initiatives to secure access to lawful medical services.
For instance, Colombia issued standards for abortion practice
in December 2006 in compliance with its Constitutional Court
ruling [23]. Following the judgment in Northern Ireland, the
Ministry established a Working Group to develop guidance on
the abortion law and identify good medical practice. Draft
guidelines were distributed for consultation in January 2007.
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The Ministry then plans to issue final guidance to the health
professions, and informational leaflets to the general public.
In Brazil, an association of health professionals has taken
judicial proceedings [24] to resolve the ambiguity of whether
anencephalic pregnancies may lawfully be terminated, since
the criminal law allows no indication of gross fetal deformity.
Physicians will not undertake termination without judicial
authorization, which some judges have granted but others
have denied. To avoid the delay, stress, expense and uncertainty of taking each incident to court, judicial clarification
is requested [25].
As judges become increasingly responsive to women’s
claims to reproductive health and rights, recognized in
national and international human rights principles, citizens
may take initiatives to seek clarification of the grounds and
procedures for access to lawful abortion services. As
governments that respect the rule of law in practice, not
only in their rhetoric, recognize this at national and international levels, they take initiatives to formulate and
implement practices that achieve transparency in rights to
request and undertake lawful abortion.
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